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2Navy Student Theses
• Lt. Josh Dishmon
– Review acquisition-relevant applications of 
prediction markets
• Lt. Michael A. Chinn & Lt. Leslie A. Huffman:
– Prediction Markets for Navy Manpower Outcomes
– Did a pilot set of prediction markets for manpower 
outcomes (and fun topics)
Promise and Pitfalls of Prediction Markets
• Potentially VERY powerful tool
BUT …
• The “devil is in the details”
– Small changes in market design can have big impacts
– #1 rule of carpentry: “Measure twice, cut once”
• A little econ knowledge can be a dangerous thing
– A basic understanding of the principles is not sufficient 
to design and implement an effective market
– Within DoD, several examples where a good economic 
idea has been implemented in a sub-optimal fashion
– Pattern: From “too slow” to “too fast” with good ideas
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Popular (but Applicable?) Prediction Markets
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Market Focus 
Iowa Electronic Markets 
<www.biz.iowa.edu/iem> 
Run by University of Iowa 
Small-scale election markets. 
Centrebet 
<www.centrebet.com> 
For profit company 
Northern Territory bookmaker, offering odds on 




For profit company 
Trades in political futures, financial contracts, 
current events, entertainment, etc. 
Economic Derivatives 
<www.economicderivatives.com> 
Run by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank 
Large-scale financial market trading in the likely 
outcome of future economic data releases. 
Newsfutures 
<www.newsfutures.com> 
For profit company 
Political, finance, current events and sports markets.  




Non-profit research group 
Political, finance, current events, science and 
technology events suggested by clients. 
Hollywood Stock Exchange 
<www.hsx.com> 
Owned by Cantor Fitzgerald 
Success of movies, movie stars, and awards.  Data 
used for market research. 
 
Applications Relevant for Acquisition
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Sources: Chen and Plott (2002), Corporate Executive Board 2006), Kiviat( 2004), Malone (2004), Ortner (1998) 





Hewlett-Packard used an internal market system to 
forecast printer sales. HP’s official forecast erred by 13%, 
while the market erred by 6%; the market performance 
exceeded the accuracy of official forecasts 75% of the time. 
Product 
Development Eli Lilly 
Eli Lilly applied internal markets to predict which of six 
potential new drugs would have the greatest success in 
passing product development hurdles. 
General 
Forecasting Google 
Google uses internal markets to forecast new product 
launch dates and new office openings, predicting the 
likelihood that an event will occur and on a specific date. 
Product 
Development Siemans 
An internal market predicts whether the firm will deliver 
software projects on time 
Product 
Development Microsoft
Uses internal markets to predict whether projects will meet 
milestones articulated in their project plans 
Asset Value & Market Prices as Predictors
• Two dimensions of value for any asset/contract :
– Arbitrage value: Potential financial benefit from 
reselling asset/contract at a higher price at a later date
– Intrinsic value: Expected financial benefit of holding 
the asset/contract indefinitely (or until market closes)
• Many people think about the value of stocks in the 
stock market only in terms of the arbitrage value
• Prediction markets provide reasonable predictions 
only when prices reflect estimate of intrinsic value
• Thus, assets and markets must be designed to 
direct focus toward intrinsic value
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Measuring Prediction Market Performance
• Prediction markets make predictions by 
aggregating knowledge among traders
• Thus, prediction market performance can only be 
measured by degree of information aggregation
• Prediction market performance can not best be 
measured by prediction accuracy
– Predicting a coin flip
– Better weatherman: Las Vegas or Seattle?
• At best, prediction market performance can be 
measured by relative accuract
– But alternative predictions often don’t exist
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Measuring Prediction Market Performance
• “There’s a common ‘weatherman’ misunderstanding about 
prediction markets, especially in the press.  Perhaps 
counterintuitively, a weatherman is not wrong if the sun 
comes out after a 90 percent forecast for rain because 
there was still a 10 percent chance of sunshine.  Instead, 
the weatherman is a good predictor if it rains 90 percent of 
the time when he gives a 90 percent chance of rain—any 
more or less would be poor predictions.  Prediction 
markets work the same way.”
• -Todd Proebsting, Microsoft
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Prediction Markets as a Decision Tool
PROBLEM:
• Consider asset measuring project performance
• Market price drops (negative reflection on project)
⇒ DoD or agency takes corrective action
⇒ Market price goes up … or does it?
• Market price should already incorporate 
expectations about any corrective action
⇒ Market price may not reflect what you think
SOLUTIONS:
• Measure variables unaffecting by DoD decisions




• Conditional assets ask:
– “If ____, then what is the probability that ___?”
– “If ____, then what will be the measure of ___?”
PROBLEM:
• How do assets “payoff” if condition doesn’t occur?
• If zero value, distorts price as a predictor
SOLUTION:
• Closing price termination rule
• If an asset is “delisted,” each share of asset pays 
amount equal to average price over final X days
– Delisting fear should not distort prediction value of price
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• Private corporations use real money
• Resistance to using real money in government
• With play money, traders go for the home runs:
– Buy low-probability events
– Avoid high-probability events
– Leads to inaccurate probabilities of events
• Research suggests real money gives more 
accurate predictions
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Incentive Issues with “Play Money”
Incentive Issues with “Play Money”
• Competition and bragging rights as an incentive?
– Requires degree of non-anonymity (not good)
– How do traders know if they are “winning?”
– Intrinsic values not realized until after close of market
• Portfolio value as measure of performance?
– Does not recognize good predictors of outcomes
– Rewards traders for being a good predictor of other 
trader’s predictions (of other trader’s predictions …)
• Beware of research suggesting play money works
– Settings often involve intrinsic motivation
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Market Maker Concerns
• Thin market ⇒ asynchronous trades ⇒ market maker
• BUT how is price adjusted in response to trades?
– Critical for price to be a reasonable predictor
– Without knowledge of underlying supply and demand, 
price adjustment is educated “guesswork”
• Current price may not reflect aggregate belief
– Contributes to price volatility
• Alternative approach: Proxy bid/ask thresholds
– If price rises above $___, then sell ___ units
– If price falls below $___, then buy ___ units




– Pays fixed amount if outcome occurs, zero otherwise
– Price reflects market expectation of probability of event
• “Index” assets/contracts
– Pays variable amount tied to a specific future measure
– Price reflects expectation of mean value of measure
• “Spread” assets/contracts
– Pays fixed amount if & only if measure is above/below 
threshold (adjusted to balance two sides of market)
– Price reflects expectation of median value of measure
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Asset/Contract Types
• Winner-take-all markets are easiest to implement
– Allow use of market-maker algorithm for thin market
– Widely available mechanisms for doing so
BUT …
• Index markets may reveal more valuable info
– Specific date on which an event is expected to occur
– Specific degree of cost-growth that is expected to occur
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Asset/Contract Design Issues
• To be valuable, a prediction market asset must 







Thesis Student Pilot Study
• Participants: 
– N1 personnel
– Recruiting command personnel
– Researchers at NPS, CNA, other research org’s
• Questions:
– Manpower outcomes
– Generally economic outcomes (unemployment, stock 
market)
– Fun questions (NFL opener, Emmy’s, MLB play-offs)
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• Participation was very low and tailed off, despite 
encouragement from N1
– 11 of 35 non-NPS potentials made trades
• Adding “fun” questions didn’t seem to increase 
participation in manpower outcomes
• Top reasons for lack of participation:
– Lack of time
– No incentive
18
Thesis Student Pilot Study
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Pilot Experiment Results
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Pilot Experiment Results 
Price Patterns & Performance Indicators

























Alpha Beta Gamma Delta Epsilon Zeta
Traders
Period
Concerns about efficacy & commercial success
Concerns about safety
All indicators initially positive, but emerging efficacy concerns
All indicators initially uncertain, but trending positively
All indicators favorable
All indicators favorable
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Pilot Experiment Results 
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Traders
Period
Continued positive information 
Turnaround in efficacy indicators
Continuing efficacy concerns
Significant turnaround in efficacy & 
moderate turnaround in commercial 
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Pilot Experiment Results 
Price Patterns & Performance Indicators
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Collapse in efficacy indicators
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Pilot Experiment Results 
Price Patterns & Performance Indicators
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Information Aggregation (Kalovcova 2007)
• Six equally likely possible states
– A, B, …, F
– True state: A
• Five individuals have private signal of true state
– Represented by balls in an urn
• A represented by five balls; B – F by two each
• Draws:  
• Aggregate Information:  AAAAA, BB, CC, DD, 
EE, FF
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• HP found results promising for using prediction 
markets to predict future sales com
• HP and Siemens found motivating employees to 
trade a major challenge
• Microsoft limits participation to informed traders; 
uninformed traders are less likely to participate 
(risks omitting informed trader)
28
Iowa Electronic Markets
Presidential Elections 1988 - 2000
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Source: Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004
Anatomy of prediction markets:
Most common trading mechanisms• Continuous double auction:
– Person-to-person selling
– Needs to be a seller for a person who wants to buy
– Examples: Intrade, Iowa Electronic Markets
• Market Scoring Rules Mechanism:
– An algorithm determines prices based on demand for 
various outcomes
– Needed when participation is low
– Example: Inkling Markets
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Most common types of securities
• Winner take all for an event occurring:
– Price represents probability of event occurring
– Sarah Palin’s price for being 2012 Republican 
nominee is between 24.4 (bid) and 25.0 (ask)
• Index
– For continuous variables
• What will Dow Jones be?
– Intervals often used instead:
• N1 Marketplace: What was the unemployment rate going 
to be for Sept. 2009?
– Separate securities for:
» <9%, 9 – 9.3%, 9.4 – 9.7%, …
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Limitations
• Participation will often be limited
– Small # experts for most outcomes
– Many potential traders don’t understand the market
– Traders will fear some people have huge advantage 
from insider info
• E.g., Those who have authority to set SRBs
– But, uninformed traders are needed for knowledgeable 
traders to make money and have incentive to play
– Unlike with stock market, there can be long periods of 
time with no activity
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Limitations
• Thin markets (from low participation) cause:
– Less accurate predictions
– More volatility
– Need for less ideal Market Scoring Mechanism
• Traders often don’t understand short-selling
– So difficult for people to bet against something
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Limitations
• Manpower outcomes can be self-defeating
– Suppose there’s a market for whether we meet 
endstrength goal
– Trader 1 makes a correct assessment that Navy 
won’t meet goal and sells shares
– Price goes down
– Navy sees low probability of meeting goal
– Navy ups reenlistment bonuses
– Now Trader 1 will lose money
– (Are there similar potential problems for 
Acquisitions?)
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Lessons learned: need to phrase 
questions very clearly
• Inkling question: Did Juliet die on Lost? Question will 
close January 28, 2010 @ 09:34pm PST 
– Nope $26.51/ $100.00 (closed) 
– Yes....well as far as we know $17.36/ $0.00 (closed)
– Sort of but reincarnated $21.19/ $0.00 (closed) 
– Who knows - Alternative reality $34.94/ $0.00 (closed) 
• Our question, posed August 7, 2009:
– Will the Dow Jones Industrial Average (INDU) close above 
9,400 by COB on Friday, Aug. 14, 2009? 
– Dow closed at around 9395 on August 12
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